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Conflicts Over Conflicts:
Challenges in Redrafting the ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice on Conflicts of Interest
by LAURIE L. LEVENSON*

Introduction
Over ten years ago, I wrote an article Working Outside the Rules:
The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors.! The irony is

that the more I work on the current project-a project dedicated to
evaluating and redrafting rules relating to the practice of prosecutors
and defense lawyers as set forth in the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice-the more I think of that article. Rules are fine, but they will
never take the place of good judgment and a commitment to justice.
Therefore, before I get to my comments on the proposed standards,
let me share some brief thoughts on what the function of those
standards should be in criminal practice.
Robert J. Kutak probably got it right.! It is almost impossible to
think of rules without thinking of our aspirational goals. When the
"Kutak Code" was drafted in 1983, it included a Model Code of
Professional Responsibility that encompassed Disciplinary Rules and
Ethical Considerations. While the Rules set the bottom line
*David W. Burcham Chair in Ethical Advocacy, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I am
grateful to the assistance of my Research Assistants, Eman Yazchi, Miri Strucker, Jay
Strozdas and Kate Kaso, in researching and editing this paper. I also want to thank the
organizers of this extraordinary project, Professors Bruce Green and Rory Little. With
their leadership, real change is on its way. Finally, I am deeply grateful to all of the
wonderful judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, colleagues and community representatives
who participated in the round table discussions of this paper. Their insights have been
invaluable and I hope that I do them justice in addressing their concerns in this paper.
1. Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities
of FederalProsecutors,26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553 (1999).
2. Robert Kutak is remembered as chairing for five years the ABA Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards ("Kutak Commission") that drafted the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility presented to the American Bar Association House of
Delegates in 1981. Mr. Kutak was instrumental in developing the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.
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standards for lawyer conduct, the Ethical Considerations reminded
lawyers of the ideals they were trying to achieve. As we embark on
the latest revisions of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, what
are the ideals we are trying to achieve with the redrafting of the
conflict of interest rules?
The goal, I propose, is to have lawyers with loyalty. It is to have
an adversarial system where each advocate stays on his or her own
side of the line. It is to create an environment where parties,
witnesses and victims can trust their lawyers. It is to ensure that
neither the "client's" interest nor the public's interest is compromised
by a lawyer who may gain unfair personal or professional advantage
by crossing the line into the other side's camp. And, it is to ensure
that a lawyer does not feel compromised by having to do the work of
others who should be representing those conflicting interests in any
given case. Mainly, the goal is to try to put into writing the instincts
we hope all lawyers have when they are confronted with a situation
that might compromise their role in the criminal justice system.
Of course, "their role" is another tricky part of the equation.
Frankly, defense lawyers have it easy. They have a duty to a client or
clients-flesh and blood people who they have to be able to look at
and say, "I did my best for you. I put your interests ahead of
everyone else's. I pulled out all the stops and did not compromise
your interests for anyone else's-not for my own interests (financial,
professional or personal), not for another client's interests (past,
present, or future), and not for the interests of the witnesses, judge,
your family or the public. I was there for you!"
As others have written, whom does the prosecutor talk to in the
dead of night? To whom does he or she promise loyalty? To the
Constitution? To the defendant, promising that his constitutional
rights will be respected? To the victim, but only so long as the victim
does not interfere too much with the prosecutor's exercise of
discretion? To the public, but only so much as the prosecutor can
divine what the public's interests really are? With the responsibility
to exercise discretion, prosecutors know who gets their undivided
loyalty-themselves. It is, to use words rarely found in ethical codes,
a matter of conscience. As my article stated so long ago, it is a matter
of following the rule, but also doing much more. "Common sense, an
understanding of the impact of [one's] decisions on others,
perspective and commitment to a fair trial for both sides of the case
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are of the utmost importance."3 And, these, together with the rules,
are the basic tools to ensure that prosecutors act ethically.
With these thoughts in mind, it is time to turn to the conflict of
interest rules proposed by the redrafting of the ABA standards. It
would be impossible to discuss all of them in depth given the
restrictions of this project. The works on these issues fill legal
journals and I am grateful to others for this amazing body of work.
Rather, after I set forth the prior conflict of interest standards and
compare them with the proposed revised standards, I jump into a
different type of jurisprudence recently popularized by the current
Chief Justice of the United States, John Roberts, as he dissented in
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., a case that itself focused on the

ethical issues.
I would like to ask forty of the toughest questions that arise with
regard to conflicts of interest for prosecutors and defense counsel. By
asking these questions, we may see whether adopting a code of
standards will actually help guide prosecutors and defense lawyers
with the everyday conflicts of interest issues they face.! As the Nobel
laureate, Isidor I. Rabi, once retold, the secret is in asking the right
question.' The answers will flow from that.
I. Prosecution Conflicts of Interest: Asking the Right
Questions
The current Standards are divided between prosecution and
defense standards.

3. Levenson, supra note 1, at 571.
4. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2269-72 (2009) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (addressing what, if any, standards can be established to determine when a
judge should recuse himself because of a conflict of interest).
5. One of the major benefits of the roundtables held to discuss the proposed new
Standards is that there has been additional discussion of the potential conflicts that arise
for prosecutors and defense lawyers. While it is impossible to anticipate all conflicts, open
dialogue assists in identifying those situations where lawyers are most likely to consult the
Standards for guidance.
6. One of my favorite stories is one retold by Professor Rabi, who was awarded a
Nobel Prize for his work in physics. When asked how he became such a great scientist, he
answered: "My mother made me a scientist without ever intending it. Every other mother
in Brooklyn would ask her child after school: "'So? Did you learn anything today?' But
not my mother. She always asked me a different question. 'Izzy,' she would say, 'Did you
ask a good question today?"' Donald Sheff, Letter to the Editor, Izzy, Did You Ask a
Good Question Today?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1988, at A26.
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A. Prosecution Conflict of Interest Standards
1.

CurrentABA Standard3-1.3: Conflicts of Interest
Under the current standards:
(a) A prosecutor should avoid a conflict of interest with respect
to his or her official duties.
(b) A prosecutor should not represent a defendant in criminal
proceedings in a jurisdiction where he or she is also employed as
a prosecutor.
(c) A prosecutor should not, except as law may otherwise
expressly permit, participate in a matter in which he or she
participated personally and substantially while in private
practice or nongovernmental employment unless under
applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be,
authorized to act in the prosecutor's stead in the matter.
(d) A prosecutor who has formerly represented a client in a
matter in private practice should not thereafter use information
obtained from the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client unless the rules of attorney-client confidentiality
do not apply or the information has become generally known.
(e) A prosecutor should not, except as law may otherwise
expressly permit, negotiate for private employment with any
person who is involved as an accused or as an attorney or agent
for an accused in a matter in which the prosecutor is
participating personally and substantially.
(f) A prosecutor should not permit his or her professional
judgment or obligations to be affected by his or her own
political, financial, business, property, or personal interests.
(g) A prosecutor who is related to another lawyer as parent,
child, sibling, or spouse should not participate in the prosecution
of a person who the prosecutor knows is represented by the
other lawyer. Nor should a prosecutor who has a significant
personal or financial relationship with another lawyer
participate in the prosecution of a person who the prosecutor
knows is represented by the other lawyer, unless the
prosecutor's supervisor, if any, is informed and approves or
unless there is no other prosecutor authorized to act in the
prosecutor's stead.
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(h) A prosecutor should not recommend the services of
particular defense counsel to accused persons or witnesses
unless requested by the accused person or witness to make such
a recommendation, and should not make a referral that is likely
to create a conflict of interest. Nor should a prosecutor
comment upon the reputation or abilities of defense counsel to
an accused person or witness who is seeking or may seek such
counsel's services unless requested by such person.
2.

Proposed Revised Standards
The ABA Task Force has proposed the following revised
standards. As listed below, the key changes are identified by
italics.
(a) A prosecutor should avoid conflicts of interest with respect
to his or her official duties, unless an appropriate waiver is
obtained. The prosecutorshould know and abide by the ethical
rules regarding conflicts of interest that apply in his or her
jurisdiction. A prosecutor should make appropriatedisclosures
regarding conflicts of interest, to supervisors, courts, or defense
counsel, when appropriate. When a conflict is apparent, the
prosecutor should recuse or decline to go forward until a nonconflicted prosecutor is in place.
(b) A prosecutor should not represent a defendant in criminal
proceedings in a jurisdiction where he or she is also employed as
a prosecutor.
(c) A prosecutor should not, except as law may otherwise
expressly permit, participate in a matter in which the prosecutor
personally and substantially participated while in private
practice or nongovernmental employment, unless those prior
interests were substantially parallel to the current prosecutorial
interests and there is no conflict of interest, or unless under
applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be,
authorized to act in the prosecutor's stead in the matter.
(d) A prosecutor who has formerly represented a client should
not use information obtained from that representation to the
disadvantage of the former client unless the rules of attorneyclient confidentiality do not apply or the information has
become generally known.
(e) A prosecutor should not, except as law may otherwise
expressly permit, negotiate for private employment with any
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person who is involved as an accused or as an attorney or agent
for an accused in a matter in which the prosecutor is
participating personally and substantially.
(f) A prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor's
professional judgment or obligations to be affected by the
prosecutor's personal,7 political, financial, business, property, or
other interests or relationships. A prosecutor should disclose to
appropriate supervisory personnel any such interests that could
reasonably be viewed as raising a potentialconflict of interest. If
it is determined that the prosecutor should nevertheless continue
to act in the matter, the prosecutor and supervisors should
consider whether any disclosures to outside persons should be
made, and make such disclosuresif appropriate.
(g) A prosecutor whose current relationship to another lawyer
is parent, child, sibling, spouse or intimate sexual partner should
not participate in the prosecution of a person who the
prosecutor knows is represented by the other lawyer. A
prosecutor who has a significant personal or financial
relationship with another lawyer should not participate in the
prosecution of a person who the prosecutor knows is
represented by the other lawyer, unless the relationship is
disclosed to the prosecutor's supervisor [and the person's defense
counsel] and supervisory approval is given, or unless there is no
other prosecutor authorized to act in the prosecutor's stead.
(h) A prosecutor should not recommend the services of
particular defense counsel to accused persons or witnesses
unless requested by the accused person or witness to make such
a recommendation, and should not make a referral that is likely
to create a conflict of interest. A prosecutor should not
comment upon the reputation or abilities of defense counsel to
an accused person or witness who is seeking or may seek such
counsel's services unless requested by such person.
(i) A prosecutor whose own conduct is the subject of an official
investigation of a non-frivolous allegation should ordinarily be
recused from acting as prosecutor in the matter in which the
challenged conduct originated. However, a mere allegation of
misconduct is generally not a sufficient basis for such recusal,
absent a judicial or supervisory evaluation that the allegation
7. It should be noted that while "personal" interests are included in the prior ABA
standards, the proposed revised set puts them at the top of the list. Yet, there is no further
explanation as to what those "personal" interests are, or whether they include emotional,
ideological, or psychological concerns.
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warrants serious review. Neither should an unfounded allegation
of misconduct deter a prosecutorfrom fair pursuit of any matter.
Nevertheless, a prosecutor should report to a supervisor any
misconduct allegation made against him or her, in order to obtain
a second opinion of its merits.
3.

Asking the Right Questions

In evaluating these proposed standards, several key questions
jump out at the reader. As listed, these questions arise in a wide
variety of prosecutions and highlight why the ABA standards can
only be a starting point, not the final answer, to addressing conflicts of
interest for prosecutors.
a. Whom does a prosecutor represent?
It is axiomatic that a prosecutor should avoid a conflict of interest,
but this can only be accomplished if prosecutors really understand
whom they represent.' Although most prosecutors appreciate on
some intellectual level that they represent the "People" or
"Government" or the community-at-large,' on a day-to-day basis,
they answer only to themselves or to a supervisor. Most prosecutors
have relatively little contact with the community. Some have
affirmatively eschewed the suggestion that they are "social workers"
who must interact with community groups. Thus, at any given time,
prosecutors tend to define themselves more as the opponent against
the defendant, rather than in an affirmative position of representing
the public. Once this adversarial title is assumed, it is harder for
prosecutors to identify when they have a conflict of interest. So long
as the interests they have are aligned againstthe defendant, it seems
of little interest that the prosecutor's duties in representing the public
at large might be compromised.

8. Some scholars define "conflict of interest" as "some particular incentive which
threatens to impair an attorney's functioning." See, e.g., Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking
Attorney Conflict of interest Doctrine,5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 823, 831 (1992). However,
such a definition skips over the initial question of what is the fundamental role of the
prosecutor. Thus, the first inquiries must ask: What is the prosecutor's role and who is the
prosecutor's client?
9. As now Associate Justice Carol A. Corrigan of the California Supreme Court
wrote, "The prosecutor does not represent the victim of a crime, the police, or any
individual. Instead the prosecutor represents society as a whole. His goal is truth and the
achievement of a just result." Carol A. Corrigan, Commentary: On ProsecutorialEthics,
13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 537 (1986) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935)).
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Moreover, the reality of our constitutional system is that the
prosecutor must, in many ways, also represent the interests of the
defendant. The prosecutor has the responsibility of ensuring that a
defendant's constitutional rights are honored and even that the
defendant's own counsel acts without a conflict of interest. Since
prosecutors often see themselves as representing "all" interests (the
community, the defendant's, the victim's), the duties can tend to
blend into a generic question, "Am I doing the 'right' or 'just' thing in
this case?"
Obviously, ethical rules must give more guidance than just telling
a lawyer to do the "right" thing. Both the current and proposed ABA
standards for conflict of interest tend to highlight some, but not all, of
the ethical dilemmas in which prosecutors find themselves. It is left
to other provisions of the Standards to explain the role of the
prosecutor.'0 Without defining specifically in the conflict rules what a
prosecutor's "official duties" are, it is unlikely that prosecutors will
have those duties in mind when they encounter all but the most
obvious conflict situation.
It is particularly challenging to draft conflict rules for prosecutors
because some prosecutors have the responsibility of handling both
civil and criminal matters for their jurisdiction. Nothing in the
current standards addresses the difficult issues that may arise in such
situations. These conflicts may include the handling of discovery
obtained for a criminal investigation, but sought in civil enforcement
actions, or the use of civil discovery devices to obtain information that
could be useful in a criminal investigation.n We live in an era when
prosecutors regularly seek forfeitures by both civil and criminal
proceedings. The Standards do not address whether the same District
Attorney or Attorney General may lead both investigations and, if so,
how those functions must be segregated. The Standards also do not
address whether a conflict is created when a prosecutor's office

10. See ABA Prosecution Standard 3-1.2 (Proposed 2009 revision) (discussing that
"[t]he prosecutor's client is the public, acting through its duly authorized agents, and not
particular government agencies, witnesses or victims"); Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project
to Revise the Prosecution and Defense Function Standards, 62 Hastings L.J. 1113
(Appendix: ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Proposed Revisions to Standards for the
Prosecution Function) (2011) [hereinafter Little, App.: Proposed Prosecution Standards].
11. See generally Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury:
Converging Streams of Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573
(1994); Tammy Jo Berge, Supreme Court Review: Grand Jury-Disclosureof Grand Jury
Materials to Government Attorneys for Civil Use Under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1425 (1983).
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becomes the beneficiary of seized property. Thus, while it would be
convenient to state simply that the prosecutor "represents the
public," the realities of being a prosecutor are more complex.
b. Who can waive a prosecutor's conflict of interest?
No sooner do the rules state that a prosecutor must avoid conflicts
than they tell the prosecutor to obtain an "appropriate waiver" and
continue as the prosecutor. Other than stating that the waiver must
be made after "appropriate" disclosures, the standards do not attempt
to define what constitutes an appropriate disclosure or waiver.
Of course, it may not be possible to anticipate all situations in
which a waiver is needed, but more guidance is probably necessary.
There are, as the remainder of the standards identify, categories of
conflicts for a prosecutor. First, there are conflicts prosecutors might
have by prior representation of the defendant. Obviously, in those
situations, there must be a waiver from the defendant as well as a
representative of the government. These waivers must anticipate
whether the prosecutor will be too easy on a former client or,
contrary to the ethical rules, use confidential information against a
former client.
Similarly, there are the relatively straightforward conflicts when a
prosecutor has a close relationship with a witness or lawyer associated
with the case. That relationship should be disclosed to all parties
before a waiver is obtained.
Third, conflicts arise when the prosecutor has a financial,
business, or property interest in a case. While historically a person
could confront directly in a criminal court the person who stole his or
her property, the current process depersonalizes the criminal trial.
Today, any prosecutor financially invested in a case should not be
deciding whether a conflict can be waived.
Fourth, and toughest of all, are those situations where a
prosecutor may be affected by his or her own "political" or
"personal" interests. The problem is that every prosecutor is always
affected by his or her own personal and political interests.
Prosecutors want to win (by the way, so do defense lawyers), and they
know that their reputation (as well as any political ambitions they
may have) will generally be enhanced by being successful in a
particular case. Practically, there must be a way to allow disinterested
prosecutors to waive potential conflicts, but the current rules do not
set forth standards that can be used to make this determination.
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c. How transparent should the prosecutor's work and interests be?
The Ethical Standards require prosecutors to disclose their
conflicts of interests. In fact, many prosecution offices-including
U.S. Attorney's Offices throughout the country-now have
prosecutors complete a conflict of interest form when beginning a
case.12 This rule inherently recognizes the value in transparency in the
prosecutor's work.
Yet, like others in the legal profession,
prosecutors can bridle against such rules. How much of one's
personal, financial, business, and community activities should be
subject to public scrutiny? Our criminal justice system is a bit
schizophrenic. We tell prosecutors that it is not really about "them."
They are, for lack of a more glorified term, "processors" who present
evidence to the court. Yet, rules about conflicts of interest suggest
the contrary. How evidence is processed depends very much on the
personal interests and drive of prosecutors.
Transparency is good for a criminal justice system, but it is not
always comfortable. It is particularly uncomfortable when there are
no firm lines as to how much transparency is required.
d. Why should prosecutors get a head start by continuing to work in
government on matters they worked on privately?
The proposed rules would permit a prosecutor to participate in a
matter in which the prosecutor personally and substantially
participated while in private practice, so long as those prior interests
were substantially parallel to the current prosecutorial interests and
"there is no conflict of interest." Putting aside the oblique nature of
the phrase "there is no conflict of interest,"" the fundamental
question is whether a prosecutor will be able to be objective in
evaluating and pursuing a case if he had an interest in its outcome
before becoming a prosecutor.
This question highlights an important reality in considering the
issue of conflicts of interest for prosecutors. No prosecutor starts the
job with a blank slate. All prosecutors bring to the job, and to the
12. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE FORM GCO-1 (requiring prosecutor to comply with 18
U.S.C. § 208 that prohibits a prosecutor from participating personally and substantially in
an official capacity in a particular matter in which the prosecutor has a financial interest
either directly or indirectly through family members or close associates). While this form
is helpful, it focuses on financial interests and barely mentions other types of personal
interests that may cause a conflict.
13. The terminology does not specify what kind of interest. While one might assume
that the primary concern is over financial interests, there are also the ongoing emotional
and personal ties that attorneys maintain with former clients and cases.
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decisions they must make, their prior life experience and the
judgments they have developed from it. Sometimes we praise an
individual's history as "valuable experience" that he brings to the job.
However, other aspects of it may compromise the prosecutor's ability
to remain unbiased in a case. The key is to figure out what makes a
prior interest "substantially parallel" to current prosecutorial
interests and who should be making that determination.
e. Why is the standard regarding conflicts with prior clients based on
the duty of confidentiality and not the duty of loyalty?
Conflict of interest rules typically focus on ensuring that a lawyer
respects two related but separate duties: (1) the duty of loyalty to a
client; and (2) the duty of confidentiality. The duty of loyalty is based
upon a client's expectations that his or her lawyer will put the client's
interests ahead of others. The duty of confidentiality is tied
specifically to maintaining a client's secrets, even beyond those that
were learned in privileged communications.
The current ethical standard, ABA Standard 3-1.4(d), is tailored
toward maintaining the duty of confidentiality, but not the duty of
loyalty. There are regularly cases in which a defense lawyer becomes
a prosecutor and the prosecutor's office will have a matter regarding
the prior client. While a prosecutor can be fenced off from revealing
confidential information regarding that client, the mere position of
the lawyer in the office may still violate a lawyer's duty of loyalty.
Here, one particular case comes to mind. Michael Morales, an
inmate on California's death row, made headlines because he
challenged California's execution protocol. While the media focused
on the means of execution, another issue lurked in the case. Morales
was prosecuted by a District Attorney's office whose second in
command just happened to be a lawyer who had previously served as
a public defender. In fact, twenty-five years before Morales's
clemency proceedings, this particular prosecutor had actually
represented Morales in the very murder case that landed him on
death row. The court held that the lawyer's new prosecutorial office
did not need to be recused.14 So long as the lawyer did not work on
the case, the court did not believe that there was a recusable conflict.
While this case also calls into question the proper recusal standards
for prosecutorial offices," it raises a more direct issue: Even if the
14. People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1989).
15. See infra Question P: "Which jurisdiction's law should govern conflict of interest
issues and should there be different rules for part-time prosecutors?"
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lawyer's confidences from his client are preserved, is it a conflict of
interest if a lawyer presides over an office that is seeking to execute
his prior client?
From the client's perspective, it is not simply whether a lawyer is
violating his duty by disclosing confidential information. The real
question is one of credibility. When that lawyer represented to the
client that he would be the client's zealous advocate, were his fingers
crossed? Was there an exception where the lawyer, now off to be a
prosecutor, would not directly attack a client, but would nonetheless
abandon his role as the client's zealous advocate? In order to ensure
that both the duty of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality are
respected, there may need to be a broader rule prohibiting a
prosecutor, or his office, from pursuing a matter against a former
client.
f.

Isn't being a prosecutor one big job interview?
For a brief moment, think of all of the successful lawyers and
political figures you know who are touted from their first moment of
introduction as a "former federal prosecutor." Think also of whether
prosecutors develop different types of working relationships with
former prosecutors who are now representing clients. The current
and proposed standards properly state that a prosecutor should not
negotiate for private employment with the accused or anyone
representing him. After all, we do not want the prosecutor selling the
farm to line up his next job. But, an arguably greater concern has to
do with prosecutors trading favors with individuals other than
attorneys. Prosecutors want to advance their careers and it is often
those outside of the office that can help them do so. For example, in
the Jesse James Hollywood case16 a prosecutor provided confidential
information to a film producer seeking to make a movie about the
prosecutor and the case. Doesn't this compromise a prosecutor's
objectivity as well?
g. Do the Standards do enough to prevent prosecutors from exploiting
their positions of public trust?
The proposed Standards make minor changes to prior ethical
Standards, but still nibble at one of the biggest concerns when it
16. Hollywood v. Super. Ct., 182 P.3d 590 (Cal. 2008).
17. See Rita M. Glavin, Note, ProsecutorsWho Disclose ProsecutorialInformationfor
Literary or Media Purposes: What About the Duty of Confidentiality?, 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1809 (1995).
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comes to prosecutorial conflicts of interest. What limitations should
be put on prosecutors, especially those identified with high-visibility
cases, who seek to exploit their prosecution experience for personal
8 case
gain? For example, consider the prosecutor in the Haraguchi1
who wrote and promoted a novel that included details from a case she
was prosecuting. The California Supreme Court was unwilling to
recuse the prosecutor on the record in that case, but noted that if
there was an actual likelihood of unfair treatment, it would rule
differently. The court considered it insufficient that the lower appeals
court had found the prosecutor's actions "unseemly" enough to
undermine the public's confidence in the integrity of the prosecution.
If we are serious about prosecutors not taking such steps, stricter
standards are needed so courts will not so readily disregard such
conflicts. If prosecutors know there are opportunities down the road
to exploit their experiences, it is quite possible that they will tailor
their prosecutorial decisions to enrich those opportunities.
h. Why do we think that disclosure to "appropriate supervisory
personnel" is enough to prevent prosecutors from being affected by
conflicts of interests?
In many situations, disclosure to supervisors may be exactly what
is needed to prevent prosecutors from being affected by conflicts of
interest. To the extent that supervisors have more experience, have
developed more judgment, and are more detached from a particular
case, their wisdom may very well help guide the junior prosecutor."
Yet, there are at least a couple of problems in relying on supervisors
to remedy conflict situations. First, the junior prosecutor must realize
that he or she has a problem that needs advice. Second, it is not
always true that the more senior prosecutors are more responsive to
ethical issues. Sometimes, young prosecutors will be more troubled
by ethical issues than their superiors. In order to ensure that a
supervisor takes seriously a conflict of interest concern, it is important
that any ethical standards also expressly hold the supervisor
responsible for any ethical violation. Too often supervisors interpret
ethical dilemmas by junior prosecutors as a lack of guts or an
unwillingness to pursue a prosecution at full throttle. Thus, it is
important that the role of supervisor is well defined. Not every
supervisor who is good at teaching a newer prosecutor how to try a

18. Haraguchi v. Super. Ct., 182 P.3d 579 (Cal. 2008).
19. Levenson, supra note 1, at 568.
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case also has the background and sensibilities to guide a prosecutor
on ethical issues.
i. If a prosecutor has a duty to ensure that a defendant receives a fair
trial,20 why is it a cardinal sin for a prosecutor to warn a defendant
when defense counsel is compromising the defendant's interests?
It is axiomatic that a prosecutor should not interfere with defense
counsel's ability to zealously represent the client. Defense lawyers
have a tough enough job without a prosecutor badmouthing or
second-guessing that representation. Defendants, wary of the power
that prosecutors yield, are likely to defer to the prosecutor's wishes if
prosecutors are allowed to interfere with defense representation.
Yet, there are cases where the prosecutor may actually be acting
in the defendant's best interest by commenting on the actions and
abilities of defense counsel. The current rule reflects a "don't ask,
don't tell" policy. If the defendant does not ask about his lawyer's
abilities or reputation, the prosecutor is not allowed to comment.
In at least two situations, prosecutors may need the leeway to
comment on defense counsel's actions. First, in the plea bargaining
situation, there are defense lawyers who, for ideological or other
reasons, refuse to negotiate with the prosecutor. Since some
jurisdictions, including the federal courts, forbid the court from
participating in plea bargaining, the absolute prohibition on contact
with a defendant may work contrary to the defendant's interest. It is
the ethical duty of defense counsel to convey a plea offer to a
defendant. But what consequences does defense counsel face when
he refuses to communicate the offer because of his own or another
client's interest in taking the case to trial? Moreover, what about the
situation where a prosecutor does not want to make a plea offer for
cooperation because the prosecutor does not trust the current defense
counsel? The current ethical rules have decided that it is better for a
defendant to forego that offer than to hear negative information from
the prosecutor about his lawyer.
Second, in the early investigative stages of a case, a prosecutor
may be open to designating a person as a witness, rather than target,
if that witness is represented in preindictment discussions by defense
counsel with whom the prosecutor has a working relationship. Yet,
the rules prohibit a prosecutor from even suggesting a list of defense
lawyers the witness should contact. While the rule is designed to
20. ABA Standard, Prosecution
Prosecution Standards, supra note 10.

Function

3-1.2(b);

Little, App.:
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protect a prosecutor from overreaching, it also can work to a
One might ask, "Why not allow the
defendant's detriment.
prosecutor to make the referral, but only on the condition that the
defense counsel exercise his or her judgment independently of the
prosecutor?"

j.

Can we ever prevent a motion to recuse from being used as a
strategic attack on the prosecutor?
The proposed Standards have added a separate requirement that
a prosecutor whose conduct is the subject of an official investigation
recuse himself, provided the accusations are non-frivolous. The
biggest problem with this proposed rule is that no one can know
whether an allegation is unfounded until the investigation is
completed. It is, therefore, a chicken-and-egg problem. Unfounded
allegations can be (and frequently are) leveled at a prosecutor, but
whether these accusations have any basis will generally not be
determined by the time the prosecutor must decide whether to recuse
himself. It is easy to state that unfounded allegations of misconduct
should not deter a prosecutor from the fair pursuit of any matter, but
prosecutors are fully aware that the best defense is a good offense and
they have become the target of the defense's strategic offensive
efforts.
There is also the interesting question of what "recusal" really
means if the allegations are made once trial has begun. Recently, in
the prosecution of Broadcom CFO Bill Ruehle and co-founders
Henry Samueli and Henry Nicholas, the district judge "recused" the
lead prosecutor in the middle of trial.21 However, all that initially
meant was that the prosecutor could not ask questions during the
Later, when the full extent of the prosecutor's
proceedings.
misconduct was revealed, the judge ordered the prosecutor not to
appear in the courtroom and barred the prosecutor from helping the
relief prosecutor prepare for examinations of witnesses, including the
cross-examination of key witnesses in the case. Yet, even those
efforts could not sanitize the case of the offending prosecutor's
actions. Of course, all of the reports, exhibits and pleadings that the
relief prosecutor used were infused with the knowledge and
perceptions of the recused prosecutor. If recusal happens during trial,
it is simply too late to unring the bell.
21. See Rachanee Srisavasdi, Jurors Told of Broadcom Prosecutor'sMisconduct, O.C.
REGISTER, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.ocregister.comlarticles/dull-222343-broadcom-stolper.
html.
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These first ten questions reflect some of the key challenges of
redrafting the ethical standards for prosecutors. However, they are
certainly not the only questions that can be asked. In fact, there at
least ten other questions precipitated by what is not covered by the
proposed standards:
k. Should prosecutors have a duty to ensure that defense lawyers do not
face their own conflicts of interests?
Consider the following situation: A particular prosecution office
has brought two drug cases. Defense counsel Robby Little represents
Client A in Case #1 and Client B in Case #2. As far as anyone knows,
the cases are unrelated. In Case #2, prosecutors make an offer to
Client B to cooperate. During the debriefing, Client B reveals that
another defendant in Case #1 bragged about his drug transactions
with Client A. The prosecutor wants to use Client B's testimony in
Case #1, but this will put Robby Little in an impossible situation. In
order to defend Client A, Little would have to zealously attack Client
B. If Little engages in such an attack, Client B may lose the benefit of
his cooperation. Neither Client A nor Client B want to relinquish
Little as counsel (because he is known as the best in the world), but
the prosecutor is worried that there will be a later Sixth Amendment
claim. Little suggests that Client B be sentenced before he is crossexamined in Client A's trial. Whose interests prevail?
Consider also the situation where a defense lawyer has
interviewed for and accepted a job with the prosecutor's office during
the pendency of a case. If defense counsel does not disclose this
conflict, does the prosecutor have the responsibility to do so?22
There are endless permutations of conflicts of interest and often it
is the prosecution's actions that put defense lawyers in a precarious
situation. Should prosecutors be concerned when their actions create
a knotty conflict of interest issue for defense counsel? Generally, the
rules caution prosecutors from commenting on defense counsel's
abilities, unless such comments are directed to the court. Motions to
recuse defense counsel are often viewed as strategic moves to gain an
advantage over the defense. The current and proposed rules are
designed to prevent prosecution interference with defense counsel
representation, but they offer no direction as to what a prosecutor's
role should be when there is an apparent conflict or failure in defense

22.

See Anne Bowen Poulin, Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases: Should the

ProsecutionHave a Duty to Disclose?, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1135 (2010).
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counsel representation.2 3 From the prosecutor's perspective, some
effort must be made to preserve a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights and prevent a post-conviction challenge based upon conflict of
counsel. On the other hand, if defense counsel's arguable conflict of
interest is so remote, a hearing may needlessly undermine the
defendant's confidence in defense counsel.
One benefit to having an ethical standard that dictates when
prosecutors should raise a potential conflict by defense counsel is that
it may prevent gamesmanship in the use of motions to recuse. Of
course, the challenge in drafting such a standard is that it is often not
until after a case when it can be determined whether a conflict of
interest actually affected the counsel's representation.
1. Does a prosecutor create a conflict of interest by speaking to the
media?
As currently drafted, the ABA Standards cover prosecution
extrajudicial statements in a separate ethical standard. Standard 3-1.4
prohibits prosecutors from making extrajudicial statements that the
prosecutor knows or reasonably should know will have a substantial
likelihood of prejudicing a criminal proceeding. Standard 3-2.11
prohibits a prosecutor from entering into a literary agreement or
agreement for media rights prior to the conclusion of all aspects of a
case. 24
Both of these rules reflect aspects of the conflict of interest rule.
The reason a prosecutor should not make extrajudicial statements is
not simply because it may prejudice the defendant, but also because
public statements can lock a prosecutor into a position that does not
fairly and objectively evaluate the defendant's case. Mike Nifgong's
conduct in the Duke Lacrosse investigation is a primary example of
just such a phenomenon.25
The prohibition of agreements to sell literary or media rights is
also designed to make sure prosecutors evaluate a case from the
perspective of what best serves the public's interest and not the
23. For more discussion on this issue and some helpful proposals, see Bruce A.
Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor'sResponsibility When Defense Counsel Has
a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 Am J. Crim. L. 323 (1989); Vanessa Merton, What Do
You Do When You Meet a "Walking Violation of the Sixth Amendment" If You're Trying
to Put that Lawyer's Client in Jail?, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 997 (2000).
24. A prosecutor's duty of confidentiality may also be at issue in these situations. See
Glavin, supra note 17.
25. See Laurie L. Levenson, ProsecutorialSound Bites: When Do They Cross the
Line?, 44 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1040 (2010).
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prosecutor's self-interest. In essence, both of these stem from the
prohibition against a prosecutor putting 'his personal interests first.
The location of a rule, not just what it says, may influence on how
effective it is in directing the prosecutor's conduct.
m. Why should a prosecutor be prohibited from trying a case against a
spouse, close family member or intimate partner?
Perhaps it my love for Spencer Tracy and Katherine Hepburn
movies,2 but I am generally against rules that assume that family
members are incapable of abiding by their professional
responsibilities because their opponent is another family member. If
one of the goals of the ethical rules is to depersonalize a prosecutor's
role, then the proposed Standards that make irrebuttable
presumptions that a prosecutor will be driven (or perceived to be
driven) by personal interests, is inconsistent with this goal. In fact,
perhaps the need for civility among family members will actually lead
to more professional conduct by counsel. A rule that requires
disclosure and consent is both practical and appropriate in these
situations.27
n. Will conflict of interest rules be effective unless they are
accompanied by certification requirements in each case?
The ethical standards guide behavior, but more concrete action
may be needed to ensure that counsel take seriously their ethical
obligations. Therefore, just as lawyers must certify for amicus briefs
and other such pleadings the personal interest they may have in a
case, it is worthwhile to contemplate what additional procedural rules
could be adopted to ensure that prosecutors have seriously
Might it increase public
considered their ethical obligations.
confidence in a case if a prosecutor had to certify at the time of the
filing of charges that neither the prosecutor nor the investigating
agents have a personal interest in the case? While some prosecutorial
offices require prosecutors to complete a conflict sheet when handling
a case, a requirement that prosecutors certify with the court that there
is no conflict is likely to cause prosecutors to take the issue more
seriously.

26. See ADAM'S RIB (MGM 1949), in which Spencer Tracy plays the prosecutor in a
case defended by his wife, Katherine Hepburn. See also Plot Summary, Adam's Rib,
IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0O41090/plotsummary, (last visited Dec. 15, 2010).
27. See Stacey DeBroff, Note, Lawyers as Lovers: How Far Should Ethical
Restrictions on Dating or MarriedAttorneys Extend?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 433 (1987).
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One function of ethical standards can be to encourage open
conversations about conflicts so that they can be evaluated by
someone other than the lawyers most directly affected by them.
Certification requirements compel a lawyer to focus on the possibility
of a conflict of interest and make ethical behavior a priority in
handling cases.
o. Should prosecutors be responsible for conflicts of interest among law
enforcement personnel?
The motives and interests of law enforcement officials can have a
more dramatic effect on a case than even those of the prosecutors.
Yet, few prosecutors pause to ask what investment a particular officer
has in a particular case. Knowing and revealing the conflicts of law
enforcement officers may be critical to ensuring a proper case
evaluation and the fair trial of a defendant 8
I learned this lesson while working on an Innocence Project case.
The case had been investigated by a homicide detective who was out
to prove herself during the investigation of the defendant.29 It was her
first homicide case, she was being tailed by a newspaper reporter, and
she was the first black woman assigned to such a detail. Her motives
for being a hero and solving the case are clear in retrospect, but there
is nothing in the record to reveal that the prosecutor noticed how the
information he was receiving was slanted by an investigator with so
much personal interest in the case.
In order for ethical standards to be comprehensive, it may be
important to assign to prosecutors the responsibility of determining
what conflicts of interest members of the investigation team have.
And, for good measure, consider the following questions:
p. Which jurisdiction's law should govern conflict of interest issues and
should there be different rules for part-time prosecutors?
The world of prosecution often crosses state and international
borders. When a case involves crimes that take place in a multitude
of venues, should the prosecutor be able to pick and choose where to
try the case so as to affect which ethical standards will guide his or her

28. Cf People v. Merritt, 19 Cal. App. 4th 1573 (1993) (investigator whose credibility
is at issue should be removed so as to not affect integrity of prosecution).
29. The case is described in detail in the first chapter of Miles Corwin, THE KILLING
SEASON 18 (1998). See People v. Anthony, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No.
BA097736 (1995).
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conduct? Efforts to have federal ethical standards govern nationwide
have not generally been received well, even for federal prosecutions.
Thus, while the ABA Standards may propose some general
standards, we can predict that states will want to modify these
standards. Model standards are helpful, but prosecutors may still be
placed in a situation where local courts are resistant to the proposed
standards.
Additionally, some of the most difficult conflict issues that arise
are generated by part-time prosecutors. Part-time prosecutors must
be exceptionally vigilant to avoid conflicts between their criminal
cases and those of their private clients.30 Maintaining an aura of
impartiality may be particularly difficult when the prosecutor who is
prosecuting fraud cases also represents businesses. While a client
may not be a victim in a particular case, the prosecutor still knows
that his or her client may want the prosecutor to take a particularly
strong stance in a case in order to deter other potential violators.
In some jurisdictions, part-time prosecutors are "loaned" out by
law firms to the government to prosecute occasional cases. While
prosecutors are supposed to put the public interest first, there is no
denying that their primary allegiance often remains with the firm that
provides their primary employment. The work of a part-time
prosecutor is full of landmines, from the fear of prosecuting current
or former clients, to the concern that supervisors in the private
employment will second-guess their work as a prosecutor. Given the
range of conflict issues that arise for part-time prosecutors, it may be
important to have a separate standard addressing their situations.3
q. How should we deal with the "wiggle" words?
Because ethical issues involve judgment calls, there is practically
no way to draft ethical standards without using words that provide for
flexibility in the standards. Thus, the proposed standards, as with
their predecessors, are loaded with phrases such as: "appropriate"
waiver, "substantially" participated, "appropriate" disclosure,
"significant" personal or financial relationship, "fair pursuit," "likely"
to create a conflict, and more. These words reflect that at the heart of
conflict of interest rules, as with other ethical standards, lies the need

30. See generally Susan W. Brenner & James Geoffrey Durham, Towards Resolving
ProsecutorConflicts of Interest, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 415 (1993).
31. See generally Richard H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of
Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals,81 KY. L.J. 1 (1993).
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to rely on prosecutors' good judgment. The rules are guideposts, but
it takes a conscientious prosecutor to be guided.
r. How can the prosecutor's role and conflict rules be reconciled with
the victim's expectations?
Try as you may to explain that a prosecutor's job is to do
"justice," victims still believe that their rights should be vindicated.
As the flesh and blood of the prosecution's interests, it is difficult for
prosecutors not to conflate a victim's interests with those of the
prosecution. Without specifying in the rules what duties a prosecutor
owes to a victim, do the rules provide sufficient guidance to both the
prosecutor and to the victim as to how decisions in a case will be
made? The recent passage of "victim's rights" legislation makes it
imperative that the Standards give as much guidance as possible to
the prosecutor's proper role with the defendant.32 As one author
suggested, there must be a clear delineation between the victim's
lawyer and the government's lawyer." In fact, it may be necessary to
provide specific notes and commentary that identify appropriate
behavior by a prosecutor, depending on what type of conflict with the
victim arises.
s. Should conflict of interest rules focus on prosecutorial duties or
prosecutorial loyalties?
The Ethical Standards broadly state that a prosecutor "is an
administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court.""
As such, the prosecutor has the duty "to seek justice, not merely to
convict."36 How prosecutorial loyalties affect prosecutorial duties
often depends on the type of duty being performed. The current
standards seek to set forth general policies regarding conflicts of
32. This legislation has led some commentators to propose that a prosecutor can be
viewed as the "victim's lawyer" with some of the hallmarks of a traditional attorney/client
relationship. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape Victims and Prosecutors:The Inevitable
Conflict of DeFacto/ClientAttorney Relationships,48 S. TEX. L. REV. 695, 719-24 (2007).
33. Walker A. Matthews, Note, Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment: Ethical
Considerationsfor the PrudentProsecutor,11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 735 (1998).
34. Fortunately, some of the best ethicists in the country have proposed such
solutions. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, ProsecutorialEthics and Victims' Rights: The
Prosecutor's Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559 (2005) (identifying and
analyzing four possible conflicts with victims, including: (1) The Prosecutor as the
Victim's Surrogate; (2) The Prosecutor as the Victim's Avenger; (3) The Victim as an
Intervenor on Plea Decisions; and (4) The Unwilling Victim).
35. ABA Standard, Prosecution Function 3-1.2(b).
36. ABA Standard, Prosecution Function 3-1.2(c).
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interest and their effect on prosecutor conduct. Yet, there are certain
areas where prosecution conflicts of interest pose a particular
problem. For example, charging decisions, plea decisions and
sentencing are particularly problematic. Linking the conflict of
interest rules to other ethical standards that address these issues
might at least remind prosecutors of how their own interests, or those
of someone close to them, affect their other ethical duties.
For example, Proposed ABA Standard 3-5.1 will address
decisions to charge, arrest, and search. Within that Standard, in
addition to the separate conflict of interest standard, it may be helpful
to remind prosecutors that their charging decisions should not be
based upon any personal interests. It is not unusual for prosecutors,
especially in high-visibility cases, to be motivated by personal and
political interests in seeking charges." Cases can even become
personal vendettas against a defendant. It is too easy for a prosecutor
to disassociate specific functions, such as charging decisions, from the
conflict of interests of rules that should be guiding all of their actions.
Is a conflict of interest the same as misconduct?
The tension over ethical rules is often created by an accusation
that a prosecutor has committed "misconduct." Yet, there is a range
of conduct that is labeled as misconduct-from deliberately hiding
exculpatory information to misgauging how personally a prosecutor is
involved in a case." Many of the political battles over conflict of
interest provisions might be avoided if the word "misconduct" did not
become a surrogate for the straightforward accusation that there was
a conflict of interest that influenced the case.
t.

u. What kind of conflicts should lead to the recusal of an entire
prosecutorial agency?
Many of the decisions regarding prosecutorial conflicts of interest
currently focus on the difficult issue of when a prosecutor's conflict
should recuse an entire office. Traditionally, more flexibility has been
37. See Laurie L. Levenson, Celebrity Prosecutions:High-ProfileProsecutors& HighProfile Conflicts, 39 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1237, 1243-44 (2006) (describing District Attorney
Tom Sneddon's repeated efforts to prosecute Michael Jackson).
38. See, e.g., Brad Heath & Kevin McCoy, Prosecutors' Conduct Can Tip Justice
Scales, USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/
(in-depth series on
2010-09-22-federal-prosecutors-reformN.htm?POE=click-refer
prosecutorial misconduct); Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a
Prosecutor is Cited for Misconduct?, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, June 26, 2003,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/pm/default.aspx?act=main.
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given to government offices because there are fewer alternatives in
replacing them in a case. Yet, if the conflict were on the other side,
the entire defense firm would be recused. Can the difference in
imputed disqualification rules be justified?
As discussed supra,9 courts are extremely reluctant to recuse
prosecutorial offices because of the burden on prosecutorial agencies
and the belief that ethical walls can be erected between the tainted
prosecutor and the remaining staff. Yet, there is no empirical data to
support this assumption and if ethical walls are disfavored for private
practitioners, it is at least odd that they are so often accepted when
the stakes are much higher in a criminal case.
v. How do funding issues of prosecutorial offices affect conflict of
interest rules?
Because of budgetary difficulties, prosecutorial agencies are
increasingly looking to private donations to create units that can
prosecute specialized crimes. For example, a workers' compensation
unit or insurance fraud unit might be the beneficiary of donations by
companies affected by those prosecutions. Should all such donations
be prohibited? Does it depend on whether the investment is in
relation to a particular case or just generally in establishing an office?
How does one characterize this as a personal or financial interest of
the individual prosecutor?
For the last twenty years, courts have been struggling with how to
evaluate the conflicts for prosecutorial offices that serve a specific
business interest.4 0 Yet the proposed rules do not take a specific
position on this issue, which is likely to occur more frequently as
prosecution offices face increasing budgetary pressures.
II. Defense Conflicts of Interest: Asking the Right Questions
A. Defense Conflict of Interest Standard
1. CurrentStandard 4-3.5 Conflicts of Interest

(a) Defense counsel should not permit his or her professional
judgment or obligations to be affected by his or her own political,
financial, business, property, or personal interests.
39. See discussion of Morales, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1996).
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(b) Defense counsel should disclose to the defendant at the
earliest feasible opportunity any interest in or connection with the
case or any other matter that might be relevant to the defendant's
selection of counsel to represent him or her or counsel's
Such disclosure should include
continuing representation.
communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the
client to appreciate the significance of any conflict or potential
conflict of interest.
(c) Except for preliminary matters such as initial hearings or
applications for bail, defense counsel who are associated in
practice should not undertake to defend more than one defendant
in the same criminal case if the duty to one of the defendants may
conflict with the duty to another. The potential for conflict of
interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that
ordinarily defense counsel should decline to act for more than one
of several codefendants except in unusual situations when, after
careful investigation, it is clear either that no conflict is likely to
develop at trial, sentencing, or at any other time in the proceeding
or that common representation will be advantageous to each of
the codefendants represented and, in either case, that:
(i) the several defendants give an informed consent to such
multiple representation; and
(ii) the consent of the defendants is made a matter of judicial
record. In determining the presence of consent by the
defendants, the trial judge should make appropriate inquiries
respecting actual or potential conflicts of interest of counsel
and whether the defendants fully comprehend the difficulties
that defense counsel sometimes encounter in defending
multiple clients.
(d) Defense counsel who has formerly represented a defendant
should not thereafter use information related to the former
representation to the disadvantage of the former client unless the
information has become generally known or the ethical obligation
of confidentiality otherwise does not apply.
(e) In accepting payment of fees by one person for the defense
of another, defense counsel should be careful to determine that he
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or she will not be confronted with a conflict of loyalty since
defense counsel's entire loyalty is due the accused. Defense
counsel should not accept such compensation unless:
(i) the accused consents after disclosure;
(ii) there is no interference with defense counsel's
independence of professional judgment or with the clientlawyer relationship; and
(iii) information relating to the representation of the accused
is protected from disclosure as required by defense counsel's
ethical obligation of confidentiality.
(f) Defense counsel should not permit a person who
recommends, employs, or pays defense counsel to render legal
services for another to direct or regulate counsel's professional
judgment in rendering such legal services.
(g) Defense counsel should not defend a criminal case in which
counsel's partner or other professional associate is or has been the
prosecutor in the same case.
(h) Defense counsel should not represent a criminal defendant in
a jurisdiction in which he or she is also a prosecutor.
(i) Defense counsel who formerly participated personally and
substantially in the prosecution of a defendant should not
thereafter represent any person in the same or a substantially
related matter. Defense counsel who was formerly a prosecutor
should not use confidential information about a person acquired
when defense counsel was a prosecutor in the representation of a
client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter.
(j) Defense counsel who is related to a prosecutor as parent,
child, sibling or spouse should not represent a client in a criminal
matter where defense counsel knows the government is
represented in the matter by such a prosecutor. Nor should
defense counsel who has a significant personal or financial
relationship with a prosecutor represent a client in a criminal
matter where defense counsel knows the government is
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represented in the matter by such prosecutor, except upon
consent by the client after consultation regarding the relationship.
(k) Defense counsel should not act as surety on a bond either for
the accused represented by counsel or for any other accused in
the same or a related case.
(1) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, defense
counsel should not negotiate to employ any person who is
significantly involved as an attorney or employee of the
government in a matter in which defense counsel is participating
personally and substantially.
2. Proposed Defense Conflict of Interest Standards

The proposed ABA standards for conflict of interest are still a
work in progress and have not yet been finalized by the Standards
Committee. Accordingly, they will not be quoted in this article.
Moreover, given my background as a former prosecutor, I recognize
that some may say that I have my own "conflict of interest" in
critiquing the ethical obligations of defense counsel. Yet, after thirty
years of teaching professional responsibility, there are some key
questions I would ask of any proposal for changes. These questions
identify how challenging the effort is to draft conflict of interest
standards for defense lawyers, as well as prosecutors.
3.

Asking the Right Questions

a. To whom does a defense lawyer owe a duty of loyalty?
Traditionally, the answer to this basic question is that a defense
attorney has a duty of loyalty only to the defendant. This, it is said, is
the backbone of not only the ethical rule, but also the Sixth
Amendment. A client is defined as the person who is the party in the
action, not someone paying his or her bills. Yet, the rules are not
absolute because an attorney also has a duty of loyalty to the "court"
or the justice system. Thus, defense counsel must act within the
bounds of the law. The question, therefore, is both to whom does a
defense lawyer owe a duty of loyalty and what does that duty cover?
It is the struggle to answer this question that can create the biggest
conflict issues for defense lawyers, especially given that their
perspective may be very different from that of the judge, whose
primary interest is to enforce the court's rules.
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b. To what extent can a defense lawyer's duty be affected by former
clients?
Defense lawyers are not consiglieres.41 Thus, the traditional
admonition that defense counsel should not let his or her personal
judgment be affected by loyalties to a former client can be somewhat
puzzling. Certainly, absent some exceptions, a lawyer retains forever
the duty of confidentiality and attorney-client privilege.42 Yet, once a
client's case is concluded, is there a reason the lawyer should never
represent a witness or other party in a case against that client? Is it
because a client will be upset that his lawyer has betrayed him? Or,
because without such a promise, it will be nearly impossible for the
lawyer to create the trusting relationship he needs to represent the
client? To the extent defense counsel do have a duty of loyalty to
former clients, it would be helpful to have rules that detail the extent
of that duty.
c. Should the conflict of interest rules be the same for retained counsel
as they are for appointed counsel?
The conflict of interest rules seek to provide protection for a
client by requiring disclosure of actual or potential conflicts of
Yet, the
interest and requiring written, informed consent.
voluntariness of that consent may differ dramatically for defendants
depending on whether they have retained or appointed counsel.
Defendants who can afford retained counsel have the ability to seek
out counsel without conflicts of interest. Defendants with appointed
counsel have more limited choice. While they may receive new
counsel, they will undoubtedly worry about whether they are being
given "leftovers" by seeking another lawyer without a conflict.
Moreover, they may misperceive that a lawyer who has a connection
to other parties in a case actually may have more inside information
than an impartial lawyer who may be appointed.
d. Do the ethical rules really matter given that the judge has the
ultimate say as to whether a conflict of interest can be waived?
In Wheat v. United States,43 the Supreme Court held that even if a
defendant is willing to waive a conflict of interest, the court still has
the power and responsibility to appoint new counsel if it is concerned
41. "Consigliere" is a close advisor or counsel, although the term is often used to refer
to a lawyer for the Mafia, as popularized by Mario Puzo's 1969 novel, "The Godfather."
42. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
43. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).

906

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 38:4

about defense counsel's conflict of interest. The remaining question
is whether Wheat creates an incentive or disincentive for defense
counsel to identify conflicts of interest. Some might argue that the
Court created an incentive for defense counsel to be extra vigilant
about conflicts because of the need to be accountable to the court.
On the other hand, some defense counsel may proceed in a conflict
situation because if the court does not interfere, it would seem not to
violate the Standards.
An important related question is whether more specific rules
should be drafted to control waiver of concurrent representation by
multiple clients." At the time that clients must decide whether to
waive independent counsel, they may not appreciate the impact of
such a waiver unless very specific warnings are provided. What kind
of warnings these should be may vary by the type of case. A generic
rule that allows for waiver in multiple defendant cases may be
insufficient to ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver by the client.45
e. Does incompetence create a conflict of interest? What about
representation by defense counsel who themselves face criminal

prosecution or professional discipline?
A perennial problem for defendants seeking relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel is the conflict between the defendant's interest
in securing a new trial and defense counsel's interest in maintaining
his reputation and justifying their actions and inactions in defending
the defendant. This problem is minimized by the appointment of
separate counsel for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but
there is still an incentive for defense counsel, even in trial, to blame
the client for bad strategic decisions. The traditional conflict of
interest rule does not address this problem in anything but the most
general prohibition against conflicts with a lawyer's "personal
interests."
Sadly, there is also a growing problem of defense lawyers
handling cases while they themselves face prosecution or professional
discipline." Defense lawyers in those situations face a unique type of
44. See Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407 (1998).
45. See Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases,
58 U. KAN. L. REv. 43, 78 (2009) (suggesting that conflicts of interest are not easily
remedied by providing decision-makers with information and that defendants will
necessarily discount such information).
46. For an excellent work on this issue, see generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Conflicts
of Interest in Criminal Cases: Should the Prosecution Have a Duty to Disclose?, 47 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1135 (2010).
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conflict. While their clients expect them to argue zealously in favor of
the client's case, the lawyers themselves must be careful not to
antagonize the prosecutors who may hold their own fate in their
hands. 47 Again, one would hope that a defense lawyer would
recognize this as a "personal interest" in conflict with a client, but the
problem may be egregious enough that a specific standard should be
drafted to deal with this issue. Current law makes it extremely
difficult for a defendant to seek relief even if he or she is represented
by a lawyer with this conflict. 48 Thus, prophylactic ethical rules are
needed.
Does defense counsel who is seeking employment with a prosecution
office at the time of representation also have a conflict of interest?
Currently, the ABA defense standards prohibit defense counsel
from representing a criminal defendant in a jurisdiction in which he
or she is also a prosecutor.4 9 However, this prohibition does not go
far enough. In some cases, defense counsel may be interviewing with
the prosecutor's office or may have gone so far as to accept
employment with that office.50 Even at these early stages, defense
counsel has an interest in ingratiating himself or herself with the
prosecutor's office. At minimum, defense counsel should have a duty
to advise the client of the lawyer's activities so that the client can
gauge and monitor whether the lawyer is compromising the client's
interests in an effort to seek a position in the prosecutor's office.
Thus far, courts have not found that a defense lawyer seeking
employment in a prosecution office creates a disqualifying conflict of
interest." Thus, it is important that the Ethical Standards be
f.

47. See, e.g., Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1992) (If an attorney is
under criminal investigation, he may "pull his punches in defending his client lest the
prosecutor's office be angered by an acquittal and retaliate against the lawyer.").
48. See Poulin, supra note 46, at 1172-73 (noting that early intervention in the conflict
is important because "not all courts are receptive [to post-conviction challenges] and the
defendant faces a daunting obstacle regardless of whether the court applies the [Supreme
Court's precedent under] the Sullivan rule or the Strickland test").
49. ABA Standard, Defense Function 4-3.5(g).
50. See, e.g., Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2008).
51. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Agbanyo, 872 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (no
conflict of interest even though defense counsel had accepted a position at county
prosecutor's office); Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 1994) (no conflict
even though defense counsel was scheduled to be employed in prosecutor's office); People
v. Martinez, 98 Cal.Rptr. 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (no conflict despite counsel's
acceptance of employment offer from prosecutor's office).
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amended to make that conflict clear.52
thoughtfully suggest such a new rule."
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The proposed Standards

g. Are there sufficient disclosures to remedy a conflict of interest and
should independent counsel advise a defendant regarding potential
conflict issues?
The ABA Standards are probably overly optimistic in believing
that a defendant can knowingly and voluntarily waive a conflict of
interest. This is because it is often impossible for defense counsel to
review sufficient information and defense strategy to get a knowing
defense waiver. When a conflict arises, defense counsel typically
seeks immediate recusal with only the minimum information
disclosed to the court. Given the limitations on defense counsel in
regards to what information may be revealed, the ethical provision
that provides for waiver may create an unrealistic expectation as to
how conflicts can be resolved.
Moreover, it is questionable whether a defendant can make an
intelligent waiver of conflict without advice from independent
counsel. If the Ethical Standards are really designed to serve the
defendant's interests, independent counsel should be available to
provide such advice. While there will be additional costs involved,
the decision of which counsel to use is among the most important
decisions a defendant must make.
h. How should joint defense agreements be treated?
There are concrete conflict of interest issues that regularly arise in
criminal cases, but are not answered directly by the Ethical Standards.
Rather, practicing defense lawyers are left to divine or interpret
contradictory case law as to the effectiveness of joint defense
agreements. The redrafting of the Ethical Standards offers an
opportunity to settle how these agreements should be viewed.'

52. See generally Poulin, supra note 46.
53. See Proposed ABA Defense Function 4-1.4(i) (May 21, 2009 Task Force
Proposal); Rory K. Little, The Role of Reporterfor a Law Project, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q.
747 (Appendix: ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Proposed Revisions to Standards for
the Defense Function) (2011) [hereinafter Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards].
54. See generally Lisa A. Mathewson & Catherine M. Recker, Joint Defense
Agreements in the CorporateContext: No Guarantees,29 Champ. 20 (Sept./Oct. 2005).
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i. Should conflict of interest rules be stricter or more lenient for preindictment representation?
The current Standards do not address specifically the ethical
issues that arise in representation of defendants in grand jury matters
and pre-indictment negotiations. Yet, independent representation
may be critical at this stage. While the general standards prohibiting
one's loyalties from being affected by other or potential clients
provides some guidance, the rules could be more precise. Is it proper
for a lawyer to represent two witnesses before the grand jury if they
both agree after full disclosure? Is it proper to do so if the lawyer
knows that the grand jury proceeding is essentially an audition as to
who will be immunized for trial and who will not?
The most difficult types of conflicts arise when clients decide to
cooperate with an investigation. This can happen at any stage of the
proceedings. Not only can there be a direct conflict between multiple
clients, but the prospect that a client will become a government
informant means that clients can continue to create conflicts of
interest, as they are mined for information regarding other possible
criminal activities and associates.

j.

To what extent does the duty of candor to the court interfere or
redefine the duty of loyalty?
A lawyer may not knowingly present false information in court."
While the Standards incorporate this rule, they do not address the
conflict of interest created for defense counsel when a client wants to
testify falsely. In describing conflicts of interest, it may be helpful for
this specific type of conflict to be identified and a specific prescription
for dealing with the issue offered.
k. "No good deed goes unpunished": When does helping a client create
a conflict of interest?
Although the Standards prohibit a lawyer from acting as a surety
for a client, they do not prohibit other actions that may begin by
serving the client's interest but ultimately create a conflict. For
example, may a lawyer propose to the court that the defendant live
with the lawyer so that the client can be released on a personal
recognizance bond? Is it a conflict for the lawyer to use his own
reputation and prestige to help a client? If the goal of the Standards
is to maintain a purely professional relationship between lawyer and

55. ABA Standard, Defense Function 4-7.5(b) (May 2009).
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client, the little things that lawyers do to help their clients everyday
may pose more of a risk to that relationship than the posting of a
bond.
1. Should the Standards set forth specific warnings that must be given
to prevent conflicts of interest?
Judges have been very concerned lately about lawyers failing to
advise persons during internal investigations related to criminal cases
that the lawyer represents the entity and not the individual. These
are commonly referred to as Upjohn warnings." Given the frequency
with which this issue arises, a remodeling of the Standards might
include specific warnings that are designed to prevent, not just
remedy, conflicts of interest.
m. Why doesn't defense counsel's belief that a client is guilty create a
conflict of interest?
One can anticipate that the answer to this question is because the
defense lawyer has a duty to represent a client regardless of whether
the client is guilty or innocent. Many a noble word has been said
about this topic. However, it is undeniable that a lawyer's belief in
the innocence or guilt of a client can, in at least subtle ways, affect the
lawyer's decision making in a case. The reason the lawyer's beliefs do
not create a conflict of interest is because lawyers are not supposed to
be influenced by those beliefs. Yet, human nature is a bit more
complicated than the rules might presume.
n. Does a defense lawyer have a conflict of interest if the defendant
moves to replace counsel but is unsuccessful in doing so?
The prescription for many potential conflicts of interest for
defense lawyers is "not to take personally" actions or words of a
client that might otherwise influence the lawyer. In fact, a client's
words and actions may cause a lawyer to withdraw for a conflict. One
can only take so much abuse. However, many lawyers, devoted to the
ideal of representing a person charged by the state, tend to deny the
personal impact such actions and words may have on the client. The

56. See Timothy M. Middleton, "Watered-Down Warnings": The Legal and Ethical
Requirements of CorporateAttorneys in ProvidingEmployees with "Upjohn Warnings" in
Internal Investigations, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 951 (2008). See also Jeffrey Eglash,
Gordon A. Greenberg & Laurie L. Levenson, Avoiding the Perils and Pitfalls of Internal
Corporate Investigations: Proper Use of Upjohn Warnings, Conference Paper, ABA
Section of Litigation Corporate Counsel CLE Seminar, Feb. 11-14, 2010.

Summer 20111

CONFLICTS OVER CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

911

Ethical Standards envision a defense lawyer with infinite patience and
the thickest of skins.
There are similar tensions when a lawyer is appointed to
represent a defendant as a standby counsel. To what extent do
conflict of interest issues arise in these scenarios and what should be
the working relationship between counsel and the pro se defendant
when the defendant has made it clear that he or she does not
welcome counsel's input?"
M. Final Questions
The roundtable discussions held on these issues have produced
many more issues that should be addressed in revising the ABA
Standards on Conflicts, both for the prosecution and the defense. It is
evident that the conflict issues that arise in white collar cases are
often very different from those in cases involving street crimes.
Likewise, the conflict issues for prosecutors in large offices differ
significantly from those of prosecutors in smaller counties who handle
both criminal and civil matters. It is a Herculean challenge to draft
rules that provide enough specificity to provide guidance, yet cover
the myriad of unique conflict situations that regularly arise.
Ultimately, solving the challenge of drafting a code that
adequately addresses conflicts of interest requires that the drafters be
prescient enough to anticipate situations and questions not yet
addressed. It also involves asking the most basic questions about
ethical standards. These constitute the last four of the forty questions
I propose:
Are the standards for the client's (or public's) sake or ours (the
lawyers)?
Do we have the resources to set the standards we would like to
set?
Will the court undermine these standards by creating
constitutional standards that do not require enforcement of these
standards?
Will lawyers be honest enough in evaluating their situations to
properly apply the standards?
The redrafting of ethical standards offers the opportunity to ask
the right questions, even if we do not have the perfect answers. We
learn from the discourse and anticipate the very issues that the

57. See Meghan H. Morgan, Standby Me: Self-Representation and Standby Counsel in
a Capital Case, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 367 (2004).
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shareholders in the criminal justice system must face daily. While this
essay addresses forty of the most important issues, there are certainly
Ethical Standards do not stand
more than can be asked.
independently of each other. Conflicts issues are raised throughout
the Standards.8
In this paper, I offer a range of questions we can debate as we
critically examine the wide range of conflicts of interest issues in
criminal cases. Hopefully, if we ask (and answer) these questions
now, the answers will not have to come during habeas corpus actions
or bar proceedings against counsel. These questions are far from
academic. They make up the day-to-day challenges of being a
prosecutor or defense lawyer in America's criminal justice system.
Thus, the bonus question we now must ask: Are we willing to learn
from our past mistakes?

IV. Postscript: "So many questions, so little time"
As could be predicted, the issue of conflicts of interest for
prosecutors and defense lawyers raises far more than the forty
questions addressed in the early draft of this paper used for the ABA
Roundtable discussions. Some of the additional questions have been
integrated into other sections of the article. However, there are two
additional questions that must be considered: (1) If we are to take the
issue of conflicts seriously, should the advice of independent counsel
be required to waive a conflict of interest?; and (2) What enforcement
mechanisms will ensure that prosecutors and defense lawyers abide
by the rules against conflicts of interest?
As for the right to independent advice regarding conflicts, in the
best of all worlds, all clients would have the right to consult with
independent counsel before waiving a conflict of interest. The
problem is that we live in a world with limited resources. Thus,
neither the current nor proposed Standards require that a client
receive independent advice before waiving a conflict of interest.
Without this requirement, there is a greater burden on the courts to
ensure that the client is making a knowing and intelligent waiver.
With regard to enforcement mechanisms, there are a variety of
models that may be considered, including: (1) the use of professional
58. For example, Proposed ABA Standard for Criminal Justice, Defense Standard 43.5 prohibits literary or media rights agreements. Presumably this is because of conflict
that such agreements raise. See Ria A. Tabacco, Defensible Ethics: A Proposalto Revise
the ABA Model Rules for Criminal Defense Lawyer-Authors, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 568
(2008).
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responsibility or "ethics czars" to provide guidance in prosecution
and defense offices; (2) court ombudsmen to resolve ethical issues; (3)
ethical walls that screen lawyers from conflicts; (4) certification
requirements; (5) reporting requirements when conflicts of interest
are observed; (6) mandatory education requirements; and (7) office
policy manuals.
However, while all of these are important approaches to consider,
prosecutors and defense lawyers must have internal guidance
mechanisms as well. They must be alert to potential ethical problems
and understand how they might affect the lawyer's ability to perform
a crucial role in the criminal justice system.
In the end, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that these
conflicts do not undermine the fairness of a criminal proceeding
resides with both the court and counsel. While lawyers must be
guided by both moral compasses and ethical standards, conflict rules
are not just a matter of ethics; they are a key aspect of the right to due
process and have a profound impact on the public's sense of
confidence in the criminal justice system. "[C]ourts have an
independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted
within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal
proceedings appear fair to all who observe them."59 The goal of
refining the ethical standards is no less than ensuring that the criminal
justice system provides a venue for a fair trial for the defendant and
the People.

59. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159.
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